Woodruff blames disciplinary counsel, asks for show cause order’s discharge

Disbarred lawyer Stephen C. Woodruff blames disciplinary counsel Thomas Clifford for the show-cause order that the CNMI Supreme Court recently issued against him.

Woodruff said the Supreme Court should require Clifford to pay him a fee equivalent to the time he spent responding to Clifford’s “frivolous urgings.”

Clifford’s actions resulted in the necessity for him to respond to the high court’s order, said Woodruff in his response to the order to show cause. He also asked the high court to discharge the order.

Supreme Court Associate Justice Perry B. Inos had ordered Woodruff to explain why the court should not dismiss his appeal, strike the appendix and portions of his brief, or issue sanctions against him.

Inos issued the order after Woodruff filed a long brief in the wrong font size and an appendix separate from the brief.

Woodruff had appealed to the high court Superior Court Associate Judge David A. Wiseman’s June 2013 order that disbarred him from practicing in local courts for committing 44 violations of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.

In his corrected response to the show-cause order yesterday, Woodruff said the high court’s order appears to have been prompted by Clifford’s motion to dismiss the appeal.

He said many of Clifford’s actions in the high court and the trial court distort and misrepresent the facts and the law.

Woodruff said he did not request, and was not granted, a “discretionary extension of time” pursuant to Supreme Court Rules. He said he asked the high court, pursuant to Rule 27, to stay briefing, disqualify the disciplinary counsel, and appoint an appeal conference officer.

Woodruff noted that an ironclad prohibition of any further extension after an automatic extension has been granted would offend due process of law and would be contrary to the interests of justice. The simple reason, he said, is that there always exists the possibility of the unpredictable and the unexpected, even the calamitous, and events and circumstances outside the control of the party facing the deadline.

On the font issue, Woodruff said the Rule states that “briefs should be typed in proportionally-spaced 11-point font. He said this rule is stated in hortatory, not mandatory, terms, using word “should.”

On the long brief issue, Woodruff said the Rule specifies that a brief “may not exceed 35 pages total, inclusive of the caption, headings, table of contents, etc.”

Woodruff said the scope of et cetera is not defined, but applying a rule of kind would appear to include the table of authorities and the statement of related cases but exclude the cover, the certificate of service and any addenda.

“This is a deviation both from the prior CNMI appellate rules and usual appellate practice in other jurisdictions, both of which generally exclude tables of contents and authorities and certificates,” he said.

The new rules, he added, provide no explanation of the rationale of the change.

Woodruff suggested that the most sensible approach is to have page limits apply to the body of the brief only.

On the failure to file the appendix together with the opening brief, Woodruff said the sanction provision of the Rule applies only to the brief and says nothing whatsoever about the appendix. He said the appendix, although required to be filed with the brief, is not part of the brief.

Moreover, Woodruff said, the principle of substantial compliance should apply throughout the rules, not just to the technical specifications of the brief.

He said his filing of the appendix a few hours later should be considered substantial compliance.