High court vacates burglary sentence, remands to new judge

The Supreme Court issued its opinion last Friday in Commonwealth v. Jeffrey Jindawong Lizama, 2017 MP 5. The high court, in a plurality opinion, vacated Jeffrey Lizama’s sentence, finding the trial court failed to properly individualize Lizama’s sentence and improperly denied Lizama’s parole eligibility without offering sufficiently individualized justification. The high court also determined sentencing should be done by a new judge on remand. The press statement from the Judiciary did not identify the previous judge that handled Lizama’s case.

This was the second time the Supreme Court considered Lizama’s sentence for the underlying burglary offense. In 2015, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded Lizama’s initial sentence, which was issued pursuant to a plea agreement. There, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings because the trial court lacked adequate factual basis to accept Lizama’s guilty plea and failed to order a presentence investigation report.

On remand, the case was submitted to the same sentencing judge, and again, Lizama received the maximum sentence permitted under the statute after pleading guilty.

On March 17, 2016, Lizama appealed his second sentence on three grounds. He argued the trial court employed a mechanistic sentencing policy, failed to properly individualize his sentence, and failed to offer individual justification for the denial of parole. Lizama also asked the high court to remand the case to a new judge for sentencing if it found the trial court erred.

All three justices agreed Lizama’s sentence should be vacated and sentencing should be assigned to a new judge on remand. However, each offered a different reason for their decision. In the controlling opinion, authored by Associate Justice John A. Manglona, the high court considered the three factor Woosley test first used by the High Court in Commonwealth v. Jin Song Lin, 2016 MP 11, and determined the trial court did not employ a mechanistic sentencing policy. However, the court found the sentence should be vacated because the trial court failed to properly individualize Lizama’s sentence and had impermissibly restricted Lizama’s parole eligibility. The high court also found it appropriate to direct the presiding judge of the Superior Court to assign sentencing to a new judge on remand in order to preserve the appearance of impartiality.

In the first concurrence, Chief Justice Alexandro C. Castro agreed Lizama’s sentence should be vacated and sentencing should be assigned to a new judge on remand. However, he concluded the first Woosley factor was met, and therefore the high court should find the trial court employed a mechanistic sentencing policy.

The second concurrence, authored by Associate Justice Perry B. Inos, agreed with the controlling opinion that none of the Woosley factors were met, but argued the trial court had sufficiently considered Lizama’s individual characteristics, and therefore the maximum sentence was, while harsh, properly individualized. However, Inos agreed the sentence should be vacated due to the denial of parole, and on remand, sentencing should be assigned to a new judge.

The high court’s full opinion is available at http://www.cnmilaw.org/supreme16.html.