Petrowealth in China’s Wanglishitang

How are you doing with the Chinese Communists? was the way the question from family, friends, and associates was posed. The accent on “communists” was very telling as it became evident that the question did not seek understanding as much as it sought confirmation of their fear and prejudice on the terrible red shirts of Zhongguo.

This was very pronounced among fellow Pinoys who are otherwise glocal in perspective but in this case, carried the homegrown prejudices against China. My mother used to exclaim when we exhibited unrefined manners: “Kas ka la Intsik (the last word being a pejorative term used against the ‘uncouthed’ Chinamen)?” We also referred to them as “tsonggoy,” which is a play on “onggoy” (monkey) and “Zhongguo” (Chinese).

Wanglishitang, the “Ten thousand miles of Stone Pond” in old Chinese maps, is South China Sea in contemporary geography, except the Philippines recently started calling it the West Philippine Sea. Prejudice, I can understand; subservience to oil, I don’t.

This traditional stone pond was claimed by French Indochina when it extended the sovereignty of Vietnam to the Spratlys at a time when the Chinese government was too weak to raise a howl. The warlord period and civil war did not help until the Kuomintang finally found its national cajones, but it came too late as its rival, the Communist Party, through the people’s liberation army, peasants, students and industrial workers propelled itself. The U.S. saw red and fanned the heat of fear some more.

The Philippines and Vietnam have since occupied parts of Spratly, and islands in the Paracel, by Vietnam and Taiwan. The objective evidence that the South China Sea basin was a part of China’s geography no longer applies since the area is rich in fish and mineral resources; commercial oil gushed out in Palawan in 1974 while Brunei and Malaysia hit black gold earlier. Covetousness is primetime.

In 1949, China reestablished its territorial integrity and she got the goodwill of Koreans in Manchuria during the Korean conflict, but was severely criticized for its crackdown on Tibet (Xizang). The Islamic “Stans” in its borders pressures Urumqi and the rest of Xinjiang, but China’s rather liberal treatment of its minorities make it within internal management. The Dalai Lama’s vocal opposition after a reactionary armed uprising earlier makes the reconciliation difficult; the West’s continuing decision to take side leaves the situation more confrontational than necessary.

Claims on Spratly and Paracel are aggressive, with physical occupation of islands unilaterally undertaken without knowledge of the others involved. Muscle is deployed by all parties, with unhappy consequences. Vietnam solidifies its claims by naval visitation leaving Malaysia, the Philippines, and Brunei hanging on to the 1983 Convention on the Laws of the Sea of which China is a signatory. The U.S. Senate declined to ratify it.

We go with Chief Washington of Seattle who, when his tribe was asked to sell some real estate to the U.S. government, allegedly responded: “How can we sell what we do not own?” Wanglishitang by practical definition, can no longer be fully claimed by China; on the other hand, those who have asserted themselves into the territory need to recognize that what are wells of petrowealth, fish and mineral resources had been China’s sovereign domain, and the resolution of claims and counterclaims on a win-win basis can be reached only by consensus rather than force.

Ours has become a contentious world. The U.S. continues to rattle the saber, the latest being VP Joe Biden’s proud declaration that the U.S. will be a Pacific power even as its forward military installations in 150 countries have become obsolete. Washington encourages Vietnam and the Philippines to assert their sovereign rights over disputed islands through military capability on the pretext that in doing so we insure the free flow of maritime traffic in the South China Sea. Duh.

We might be more honest to simply say that we covet the oil underneath South China Sea, and smart business dictates that equitable sharing by those who border into the region in joint ventures, multinational investments and cooperative labor is the preferred choice. Alliances and treaties already exist to make such efforts possible. But Defense trumps State on this one.

A Canadian colleague expressed his preference of American military might around the world rather Chinese and when asked if I think China has a propensity to play that role, I pointed to the historical evidence that China’s skirmishes over border disputes in Tibet, Mongolia, and Vietnam are more in defense of traditional border lines rather than expansionist moves to occupy land beyond one’s borders. There are no military deployments outside of its borders, and research on laser anti-ballistic missiles, carriers, and anti-carrier technology development is for commerce. The country has a non-interference policy on the affairs of others outside its traditional borders.

A Colorado colleague’s rejoinder was telling: “I really do not know much about China, but I am clear, I am afraid of them.” Fear is clearly not the beginning of wisdom in this case.