Lizama vacates $139K judgment vs Bradshaw

The Superior Court has vacated a $139,000 default judgment issued against former Public Auditor Robert D. Bradshaw in connection with a lawyer’s wrongful termination lawsuit filed against him 10 years ago.

Associate Judge Juan T. Lizama ruled that Bradshaw, who was temporarily appointed to the post, was never properly served with the original complaint filed by plaintiff attorney Robert A. Bisom.

The service of Bisom’s complaint and summons on the Attorney General did not constitute service on Bradshaw, said Lizama in granting Bradshaw’s motion to vacate the default judgment.

“Bradshaw had a right, under CNMI and Washington law, to require [Bisom] to serve him personally rather than through the AG. This was communicated to Bisom’s lawyer by both Bradshaw and the AG,” the judge said.

Lizama pointed out that Bisom’s failure to follow these laws should not be sanctioned by a default judgment in his favor.

Court records show that Bisom filed the lawsuit against the CNMI government, former Public Auditor Scott Tan, and Bradshaw in 1996 after he was terminated from his job as legal counsel for the Office of the Public Auditor for alleged political and religious reasons.

On Feb. 14, 2000, the Superior Court entered a default judgment against Bradshaw.

Bison asked the court that Bradshaw be indemnified by the AG so that the latter can pay him. The AG objected to the request, saying that Bradshaw had never requested indemnification from the AG.

In February 2000, a jury rendered a verdict finding the CNMI government and Bradshaw liable to pay Bisom a total of $249,300 in damages. The six-man jury, however, did not hold Scott Tan liable for any damages to Bisom.

During the trial, Bison also filed his request for indemnification determination, but Judge Pro Tem Alexandro Castro denied it. Bisom appealed, but the High Court upheld the denial.

In April 2004, Bradshaw called the AG’s office to ask about the case. Assistant attorney general Ed Buckingham notified Bradshaw in an April 6, 2004, letter of the outcome of the Superior Court and Supreme Court judgments.

On Sept. 12, 2004, Bradshaw asked the AG to investigate potentially fraudulent return receipts in connection with service. Bradshaw understood that Buckingham had seen the return receipts.

On Feb. 15, 2005, Attorney General Pamela Brown wrote to Bradshaw, informing him that there is still a judgment against him, and that the AG does not represent him.

Bradshaw then filed a motion in Superior Court to void the $139,000 judgment against him. He claimed that he did not discover the judgment against him for three years because he was under the impression that the AG had removed his name from the case.

Bradshaw requested the court to vacate the judgment on grounds of lack of notice and fraud upon the court.

In his ruling issued on Dec. 29, 2005 Lizama said that, since Bradshaw was a resident of the State of Washington at the time of service, the form of service would have to conform with Washington law.

Lizama cited the Washington Superior Court Civil Rule, which states: “Service of summons and process, except when service is by publication, shall be by the sheriff of the court wherein the service is made, or by his deputy, or by any person over 18 years of age who is competent to be a witness in the action, other than a party.”

Bisom did not pursue any of the means of service provided under Washington law, the judge said.

Although, he sent Bradshaw two certified mailings, the mailings were not pursuant to a court order as Washington law requires, he noted. Thus, Lizama said, the two mailings that plaintiff sent did not constitute service.

The fact that Bradshaw purposely avoided mail service is irrelevant, he said.

Lizama said the only means of service under CNMI and Washington law were personal service, service by publication, and service by mail pursuant to a court order.

“None of these means were used,” said Lizama, adding that it is irrelevant whether Bradshaw purposefully avoided a form of service that was impermissible.

There is no evidence that Bradshaw avoided the legal forms of service, he said.

“Had the original complaint been properly served on Bradshaw, and, had the AG been the attorney on record in the Superior Court case, service of subsequent pleadings on the AG would have been permissible,” the judge said.

However, Lizama said, the original complaint was never served on Bradshaw.

Further, he added, the AG was not the attorney on record.

“Even if the AG had been Bradshaw’s attorney, service on the AG against the express wishes of Bradshaw would have been improper,” he said.

With respect to the fraud issue, Lizama said while the evidence of mail fraud warrants a separate criminal investigation, it has no bearing on the outcome of this case.

Although the Commonwealth Rules of Civil Procedure allows a court to vacate a judgment on grounds of fraud, Bradshaw has not shown that the judgment was grounded in fraud, he said.