Supreme court affirms 1998 deportation ruling

Resolving a 1998 immigration case, the CNMI Supreme Court ruled that the trial court has jurisdiction over deportation proceedings without an administrative hearing as long as the government files a petition to show cause.

The High Court’s Sept. 10, 2004 ruling, penned by chief justice Miguel S. Demapan, associate justice Alexandro C. Castro, and justice pro tempore Pedro M. Atalig, affirmed the Superior Court’s 1998 decision in the deportation of nonresident worker Zenaida S. Estel.

The Attorney General’s Office sought Estel’s deportation in July 1998.

On Sept. 1, 1998, the court held an order to show cause hearing and ordered the worker’s immediate deportation.

On Sept. 4, 1998 the defendant appealed the decision and sought a stay of deportation. The court denied the petition on the same day.

In her appeal, Estel, represented by lawyer Anthony Long, questioned whether the trial court properly exercised jurisdiction to determine that she was a deportable alien.

The appellant argued that the court may not exercise proper jurisdiction until the Department of Labor [and Immigration] revokes that worker’s status after holding an administrative hearing.

No such hearing or revocation took place, which according to Estel, resulted in the trial court improperly exercising jurisdiction in ordering deportation.

In its ruling, the Supreme Court said that jurisdiction over deportation hearings in the trial court is granted in Commonwealth code sections 3 CMC.

It said that it begins in the court with the AGO filing a petition to show cause.

It said that grounds for deportation exist “whenever an alien’s entry permit has expired, failed to obtain a new entry permit, or there is some other legal reason to allow her to remain.”

Records showed that due to the inaction of Estel’s transfer employer, her transfer application expired.

The expiration made her continued presence in the Commonwealth a violation of the law.

A valid nonresident worker’s employment contract, the court agreed, may not be terminated until her worker’s certificate has been revoked after a hearing.

However, the court said that Estel’s case was distinguishable because she no longer had valid legal status or a valid employment contract in the Commonwealth.

“As such, DOLI was not required to revoke her already invalid status …and the trial court’s exercise of jurisdiction over her deportation hearing was proper,” said the Supreme Court.

Meantime, while the SC affirmed the trial court’s deportation order, it remanded the case to DOL for the department’s “failure to enforce Estel’s transfer employer’s repatriation obligation” which “denied her a property interest and violated her due process.”

The appellant, who worked as housekeeper, reportedly shouldered her own deportation expense, instead of her transfer employer that faulted in the first place to comply with application rules and regulations.

In her 1998 appeal, Estel also argued that her deportation was a violation of her rights under the due process clause and the Equal Protection clause and doubted that the CNMI government established a clear and convincing evidence that she was a deportable alien.

The Supreme Court said it found no equal protection violation “as controlling immigration is a compelling state interest.”

At the same time, it said that the government “met its burden of providing clear and convincing evidence” that Estel was a deportable alien.

Records showed that Estel entered the CNMI in March 1993 on a permit, which expired in February 1994.

After resolving a complaint filed by Estel in 1994, the department granted her a transfer relief in 1996.

However, Estel’s transfer employer failed to file her labor permit within the 30-day deadline, resulting in the employer having the responsibility to repatriate her.

Despite this, Estel continued to work in the Commonwealth without a valid permit for two years.

She was finally ordered to be deported in 1998.