Supreme Court chides AGO

The Supreme Court yesterday warned the Attorney General’s Office that it will impose appropriate sanctions if the AGO continues to represent private parties without first asking permission from the high tribunal.

In a decision handed down by Supreme Court Chief Justice Miguel S. Demapan, Associate Justice Alexandro C. Castro and Justice Pro Tem Timothy H. Bellas, the high court chided the AGO when it acted as counsel to private parties in its interest to clarify the interpretation of a statute.

The high court’s decision stemmed from an appeal filed by the Pacific Saipan Technical Contractors on an administrative order issued by Labor Secretary Mark Zachares ordering the company to pay wages to nonresident workers Ataur Rahman and Abdul Wahad. Both Mr. Rahman and Mr. Wahad were represented by Assistant Attorney General Andrew Clayton.

The AGO claimed it may represent private parties in limited instances, for example to help a nonresident worker collect unpaid damages from employers who have failed to pay as ordered by DOLI’s Hearing Office. But the high tribunal rejected the argument within the context of this case.

While the provision of the Nonresident Workers Act allows the AGO to bring a lawsuit on behalf of a nonresident worker to enforce the provision of the act, the issue brought before the court is entirely different.

In this case, the AGO did not institute the civil action to enforce the act. Instead, the AGO has stepped in to act as counsel for private parties already involved in a pending action.

“While this Court does not question the AGO’s interest in the statute’s interpretation, we fail to see why the AGO felt it necessary to represent private parties in order to express its views about the statute,” the high court said.

According to the court, the more appropriate course the AGO should have taken is to have moved to intervene on behalf of the Commonwealth government. “There is no reason for the AGO to be acting as counsel to private parties when it could achieve the same purpose by representing the government,” the high court said.

Effectivity

The main issue brought before the court is whether Pacific Saipan failed to file its petition within the 15-day period for review of a final action by the secretary of labor under the Nonresident Workers Act. The question raised in this civil case is when does the 15-day period specified under the statute begins to run.

Pacific Saipan claimed that the 15 days do not begin to run until the parties are served, or alternatively, until the decision is sent to the parties by mail or fax.

But the tribunal said the interpretation most consistent with the language of the statute is that 15 days begins to run from the date of the issuance of the secretary’s decision, i.e., the date the decision is entered or filed by DOLI.

“A plain reading of the Nonresident Workers Act as a whole leads to the conclusion that an appeal to the Superior Court must be initiated within 15 days after the date of the issuance of the secretary’s decision, not 15 days after receipt of the decision,” the high court said.

In this case, the decision issued by Mr. Zachares was dated Feb. 18, 1999 and was signed by then Hearing Officer Herbert D. Soll and Mr. Zachares. But the court said it was unable to ascertain whether Mr. Soll and Mr. Zachares both signed the decision on Feb. 18, 1999 or whether one signed on the 18th and the other signed on another date as it appears that in practice, DOLI is not as rigorous as the courts about stamping each document.

Since there was no complete document to indicate the date of the issuance of the decision, the high court reversed the decision of the Superior Court dismissing the petition of Pacific Saipan for judicial review.

It also remanded the case to the Superior Court to determine the exact date the secretary of labor issued his decision.

If the court finds that the labor secretary’s decision was issued after Feb. 18, 1999, then the petition for judicial review filed on March 8, 1999 would have been timely, and the court should proceed to consider the case on the merits. However, if the court determines that Feb. 18, 1999 was the date of the issuance of the decision, then the dismissal for judicial review should stand for lack of jurisdiction.