‘Court not obliged to explain consequences of guilty pleas’

The CNMI Supreme Court has ruled that the trial court is not obligated to inform defendants of the collateral consequences of their guilty pleas.

“As a matter of public policy, courts universally agree that it would be incredibly burdensome, if not impossible, to require trial courts to research and disclose every conceivable consequence of a guilty plea,” according to the high court’s opinion issued by associate justice John A. Manglona. The opinion was concurred by chief justice Miguel S. Demapan and associate justice Alexandro C. Castro.

Clearly, the justices pointed out, requiring the trial court to advise a defendant of every potential consequence of a guilty plea would cripple judicial efficiency and fundamentally after the functions of the court system.

“If anyone has an obligation to inform a defendant of the collateral consequences associated with a guilty plea, it is a defendant’s attorney,” said the justices, citing a previous court ruling.

The justices affirmed the trial court’s decision to deny taxicab driver Pranee Jindawong’s motion to set aside her reckless driving conviction.

The CNMI Supreme Court defined in a previous decision direct consequences as having “a definite, immediate and largely automatic effect on the range of the defendant’s punishment.”

Quoting court rulings, the high court said collateral consequences are not automatic, but are “contingent on action taken by an individual or individuals other than the sentencing court…”

The justices ruled that the trial court did not violate Jindawong’s due process rights in failing to inform her that a second reckless driving conviction would result in the loss of her taxicab license.

The justices pointed out that the denial of Jindawong’s taxicab license by the Department of Commerce was a collateral consequence of her guilty plea for reckless driving.

Jindawong received a traffic citation in March 2006 for reckless driving, driving under the influence of alcohol, and failing to submit to a breath test.

Shortly before trial, in January 2007, Jindawong signed a plea agreement with the government, agreeing to plead guilty to reckless driving, and failing to submit to a breathalyzer test.

In return for her guilty plea, the Commonwealth dropped the charge of DUI.

Before accepting the plea agreement, the trial judge asked the defendant is she understood the nature of her crimes, and whether she understood the direct penalties associated with her guilty pleas. Jindawong said yes.

The trial court accepted the plea agreement, convicted her of reckless driving and failing to submit to a breathalyzer test, and sentenced her to 30 days in prison and six months of probation.

The trial court suspended her 30-day jail sentence for six months. The court ordered her to pay probation and court assessment fee, abstain from possessing or consuming alcohol, and attend alcohol counseling classes.

In February 2007, Commerce denied Jindawong’s certification of fitness and taxicab operator’s identification card (taxicab license).

In its denial, Commerce relied on the statute which states that “no person shall be licensed as a taxicab driver who has ever been twice convicted of reckless driving…”

Because Jindawong was previously convicted of reckless driving in an unrelated case, her guilty plea in the present case constituted her second reckless driving conviction. This resulted in the denial of her taxicab license.

Commerce informed defendant that, if requested, she was entitled to a hearing. She, however, did not request one.

Jindawong filed a motion to set aside her reckless driving guilty plea because the trial court did not inform her that a second reckless driving conviction would result in the denial of her taxicab license.

The trial court denied her motion, determining that the denial of defendant’s taxicab license was a collateral consequence of her conviction. The judge ruled that courts are not obligated to advise defendants of the collateral consequences associated with their guilty pleas.

Jindawong, through the Public Defender’s Office, argued that her guilty plea for reckless driving was not voluntary and intelligent in accordance with her due process rights because the trial court did not inform her of the direct consequences of her guilty plea.

In upholding the trial court’s decision, the justices cited that just as they determined in their previous opinion stating that the Attorney General’s Office and not the sentencing court, instituted deportation proceedings against an alien defendant, they likewise find that Commerce, and not the sentencing court, denied defendant’s taxicab license.

The justices said Commerce falls under the purview of the executive branch, operating independently from the trial court.

Commerce, in denying Jindawong’s taxicab license, neither acted under the authority of the trial court, nor carried out a court order, the justices said.

The justices said Commerce acted under the authority of a statute. “It is clear that the denial of defendant’s taxicab license was not a punishment imposed by the trial court, but a collateral consequences of her reckless driving conviction,” they stressed.